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•	 Adverse selection is an impediment to the efficient 
functioning of a market that arises when one of the 
parties to a transaction has more information than 
the other. In financial markets, adverse selection 
can lead to market freezes and liquidity hoarding, 
reflecting buyers’ beliefs that most securities  
offered for sale are of low quality.
•	 Uncertainty about asset values, a flight to liquidity, 
 and an underestimation of systemic risk can 
amplify the effect of adverse selection in a particu-
lar market and propagate its impact to the entire 
financial system.
•	 Government intervention can mitigate problems of 
adverse selection in financial markets. The effect-
iveness of policy responses depends on the cause 
of a market freeze.
T
 he stability of the financial system is one of the 
 main concerns of central banks: as the recent  
 global financial crisis illustrates, financial system 
disruptions can trigger a sharp contraction in economic 
activity, impair the transmission of monetary policy, 
and undermine the efficient allocation of capital. 
Continuously open financial markets are one essential 
feature of a resilient financial system (Carney 2010a). 
In the recent crisis, trading in several financial markets 
was dramatically reduced or stopped completely,
1 
and those trades that did occur were executed at 
significant discounts. Such disruptions in market 
activity played a key role in transmitting and ampli-
fying the financial crisis. The purpose of this article is 
to examine the role of adverse selection—a situation 
in which only low-quality products are available in the 
market because one party to a financial contract has 
better information than the other—in causing such 
market disruptions.
2
Information asymmetries such as adverse selection 
are the basis of the prevalent explanations for market 
freezes. If buyers cannot assess an asset’s quality, its 
market price will reflect the expected quality based on 
the quality of all the assets offered for sale in the 
market. This asymmetric information between buyers 
and sellers can generate adverse selection: as the 
price falls, sellers of high-quality assets withdraw from 
the market, leaving only low-quality assets (lemons) 
for sale. As a result, trading in the asset may diminish 
or halt altogether because buyers fear that if they 
transact they will be left with an overpriced asset 
(lemon). Moreover, such assets lose their ability to 
serve as collateral for other transactions, which contrib-
utes to the credit crunch. Adverse selection played an 
important role in the financial crisis of 2007–09 and in 
earlier crisis episodes.
1  For example, markets for collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed commercial 
paper, and repurchase agreements.
2  In his Nobel-prize-winning work, Akerlof (1970) uses the market for used cars as an 
example of adverse selection (when only bad cars—lemons— remain in the market) 
generated by asymmetric information about product quality between buyers and sellers. 
Since then, asymmetric information has been established as the potential cause of 
market breakdowns in many other cases.
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  particular market (such as the subprime-mortgage 
market) can lead to market freezes and liquidity 
hoarding and how it can be amplified into a severe 
crisis affecting many financial markets. Adverse selec-
tion is usually present even under normal economic 
conditions, but it does not significantly affect market 
liquidity. when the economy is in a crisis, however, 
adverse selection may lead to significant losses when 
market trading halts. This article describes several 
mechanisms that can significantly increase the initial 
(small) effect of adverse selection and propagate it to 
the entire financial system. while the problem of 
adverse selection can be reduced by government 
intervention, the appropriate policy response depends 
on the cause of a particular market freeze.
The article begins with a description of adverse selec-
tion and the problems it can create in financial markets. 
This is followed by a brief overview of the role of 
adverse selection in the financial crises in emerging 
economies during the 1990s and how the resulting 
capital imbalances contributed to the recent crisis. 
The next section focuses on the evidence of adverse 
selection and amplification mechanisms in the financial 
crisis of 2007–09. Finally, possible policy responses 
and their effectiveness are discussed.
Adverse Selection in Financial 
Markets
Information imperfections, such as asymmetric infor-
mation, are important frictions in financial markets. 
even in normal times, borrowers in credit markets 
often know more than lenders about the quality of the 
collateral and the riskiness of their investments. If 
high- and low-risk borrowers are indistinguishable 
ex-ante, then high-risk borrowers benefit at the 
expense of low-risk borrowers. The resulting problem 
of adverse selection (when high-quality borrowers 
choose not to participate in the market) leads to 
higher interest rates and a decrease in lending.
Adverse selection and financial instability
There are several channels, such as an increase in 
interest rates, deterioration of financial institutions’ 
balance sheets, and maturity mismatch that can 
aggravate problems caused by adverse selection and 
lead to financial instability.
In the presence of asymmetric information, a small 
increase in the interest rate can lead to a large reduc-
tion in lending. A higher interest rate increases the 
likelihood that high-quality borrowers will withdraw 
from the market, aggravating the problem of adverse 
selection. As a result, the average quality of the 
  borrowers falls, which in turn raises the interest rate 
even further. If adverse selection is severe enough, 
the credit market may collapse (Mishkin 1990). 
Adverse selection may cause banks to impose credit 
rationing—putting quantitative limits on lending to 
some borrowers. by limiting the supply of loans, 
banks reduce the average default risk and therefore 
alleviate adverse-selection problems (Stiglitz and 
weiss 1981). Another way to reduce adverse selection 
is to require collateral for the loan (Mishkin 1990). with 
collateral, even if the borrower defaults, the lender can 
recover losses by selling the collateral. Therefore, the 
asymmetric information about the borrower’s default 
probability becomes less important.
In the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion, a small increase in the interest rate 
can lead to a large reduction in lending.
Many financial institutions tend to finance long-term 
investment with short-term debt. This maturity mis-
match makes them vulnerable to economic shocks. 
even a small shock may lead to a financial crisis, 
resulting in costly asset liquidation and a large decline 
in asset prices. If the financial system’s potential 
short-term obligations exceed the liquidation value of 
its assets, the entire financial system may collapse 
(Chang and velasco 2001). For example, almost all of 
the emerging-market countries that experienced 
financial crises in the 1990s had the combination of 
large short-term liabilities and illiquid long-term 
assets. The maturity mismatch of financial institution’s 
balance sheets was also an important factor in the 
financial crisis of 2007–09 (diamond and rajan 2009; 
brunnermeier 2009).
even if there is no maturity mismatch, shocks that 
cause a deterioration in the balance sheets of finan-
cial institutions make the problem of adverse selection 
more severe by increasing credit risk. A negative 
shock to balance sheets causes banks to liquidate 
their assets, which lowers asset prices and further 
deteriorates balance sheets. This, in turn, amplifies 
the initial shock and further aggravates adverse selec-
tion (brunnermeier 2009; krishnamurthy 2010). This 
balance-sheet effect was an important factor in 
reinforcing and propagating adverse selection in most 
financial crises, including the crisis of 2007–09 and 
the earlier crises in emerging economies.
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particularly by a country’s exposure to the market for 
asset-backed securities.
The Financial Crisis of 2007–09
Adverse selection in the subprime-mortgage market led 
to market freezes and liquidity hoarding in the recent 
financial crisis. Increasing uncertainty about asset 
values, a flight to liquidity,
8 and an underestimation of 
systemic risk amplified the effect of adverse selection 
and propagated it to the entire financial system.
Adverse selection in securities markets 
and systemic risk
while banks have traditionally been the main providers 
of credit in the economy, the role of the “shadow” 
banking system in managing and diversifying risks 
has increased in recent years. The shadow banking 
system includes market-based financial institutions, 
such as investment banks, money-market mutual 
funds, and mortgage brokers. These institutions are 
the main players in securitization, which grew sub-
stantially in the past decade (Adrian and Shin 2009).
Securitization brought new information asymmetries 
to financial markets because the complexity of the 
instruments and their lack of transparency made it 
difficult for investors to evaluate securitized assets.
9 
Structured products, such as collateralized debt obli-
gations (Cdos), were created from diversified port-
folios of mortgages and other types of assets, such 
as corporate bonds, credit cards, and auto loans. The 
pooled portfolios were sliced into different tranches 
that were prioritized based on how they would absorb 
losses from the underlying portfolio. The top tranches 
were constructed to receive a AAA rating. These 
tranches were the first to be paid out of the underlying 
cash flows and were widely considered to be safe, 
with a minimal risk of default. The most junior equity 
tranches (which became known as “toxic waste”) 
were the last to be paid (Gorton 2008a).
large holdings of securitized products increased the 
exposure of many financial institutions to systemic 
risk (i.e., the risk of market-wide instability such as 
market freezes) because of their skewed payoffs: they 
produced high returns in normal times but incurred 
substantial losses during the crisis. They were also 
8  A flight to liquidity occurs when investors sell what they perceive to be less-liquid or 
higher-risk investments and purchase more-liquid assets, such as U.S. Treasuries.
9  Gorton (2008a) and Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008) provide a detailed description of 
the stages of securitization and how asymmetric information problems were created in 
the process.
Financial crises in emerging markets
The causes of the recent financial crisis are similar to 
those underlying the financial crises in emerging 
economies in the late 1990s. Asymmetric information 
between domestic investors (borrowers) and foreign 
investors (lenders) can lead to adverse-selection 
problems in a country that finances its domestic 
investment and consumption through foreign debt or 
foreign equity.
3 These informational problems may 
exacerbate financial crises, resulting in large capital 
outflows and fire sales of domestic firms.
4
Countries that have experienced financial crises in the 
past tend to have larger demand for aggregate hold-
ings of safe (liquid) assets, which provide a cushion if 
a crisis does occur (kirabaeva 2010). on the other 
hand, countries with little experience of financial 
crises tend to have smaller aggregate holdings of safe 
liquid assets relative to illiquid, risky, long-term invest-
ments. In these countries, when a financial crisis 
occurs, it is more severe and is more likely to be 
accompanied by market freezes. As a result, while 
capital flows into emerging-market countries are often 
volatile,
5 capital flows into the United States are more 
stable, driven by a search for safe instruments 
(Caballero and krishnamurthy 2009).
Caballero and krishnamurthy argue that one of the 
key contributors to the recent financial crisis was a 
safe-assets imbalance.
6 A global excess demand from 
foreign investors and central banks, as well as from 
domestic financial institutions, for safe U.S. debt 
instruments led to low real interest rates. The shortage 
of such assets provided the U.S. financial system with 
the incentive to produce new highly rated (safe) instru-
ments, primarily by securitizing existing long-term, risky 
assets.
7 These securitized assets became a source of 
systemic fragility. Indeed, Acharya and Schnabl (2010) 
find empirical evidence that the geography of the 
3  In Mexico in 1995, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, and Argentina in 2001, the debt was 
owed mainly by governments; in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand in 1997, it was owed 
primarily by private banks and firms. In all of these cases, the countries’ vulnerabilities 
were exacerbated by currency mismatches: since assets are typically denominated in 
the domestic currency while debt is denominated in a foreign currency, an unantici-
pated depreciation or devaluation increases the value of debt. As a result, financial 
crises in emerging economies are usually accompanied by a currency crisis.
4  Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2007) and Kirabaeva (2009) show how adverse selection 
can explain the fire sale of direct investments during liquidity crises.
5  Capital flows that have equity-like features (e.g., foreign direct investment) are 
regarded as more stable and less prone to reversals, while debt flows, consisting of 
bank loans and bonds, are more volatile. Speculative and volatile capital flows are 
considered to be a source of global imbalances (massive and persistent current account 
deficits) and sudden stops (sudden reversals in net capital inflows).
6  Caballero and Krishnamurthy and Schembri, Santor, and Epstein (2009) argue that 
global current account imbalances caused the safe-assets imbalances, since emerging 
markets had limited ability to produce safe assets. However, during the crisis, the 
United States did not experience the feared sudden reversal in net capital inflows.
7  Securitization is the multi-stage process of turning cash flows from a pool of non-
tradable (illiquid) assets into tradable debt instruments (Paligorova 2009).
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reduces the idiosyncratic risks of financial institutions, 
but it exacerbates systemic risk by increasing the 
likelihood of market freezes (kirabaeva 2010). when 
the economy is in a normal state with strong funda-
mentals, asymmetric information does not significantly 
affect asset values. If the market is liquid, informed 
investors can gain from trading on private information 
at the expense of liquidity traders. but increased risk 
sharing often leads to increased risk taking by financial 
institutions, which may result in significant losses 
during a crisis when market trading halts. when the 
economy is subject to a negative shock, such as a 
decline in house prices, the value of these securities 
may become more sensitive to asymmetric informa-
tion, and the resulting problems of adverse selection 
can cause market illiquidity. This supports the argument 
that the problem in the recent crisis was not only the 
lack of transparency in securitization, but also the 
sensitivity of the created securities to economic 
shocks (Holmström 2009; Stiglitz 2008).
Amplification mechanisms
How were the problems of adverse selection that 
originated in the subprime-mortgage market amplified 
and propagated to other financial markets? The 
market for subprime mortgages was relatively small, 
comprising only about 25 per cent of the outstanding 
amount in the US$6 trillion mortgage-backed securities 
(MbS) market and about 30 per cent of total non-
agency MbS issuance in the years before the crisis 
(Gorton 2008b). direct losses from household defaults 
considered liquid: financial institutions believed that if 
they needed cash, they could sell these securities at a 
fair market price, because they were perceived to be 
safe and likely to yield a steady stream of payments. 
In 2007, defaults on subprime mortgages increased, 
and a large fraction of Cdos were downgraded.
10 The 
impact of declining house prices on the securities 
depended on the composition of assets and mort-
gages that backed them. The complexity of structured 
financial products and the heterogeneity of the under-
lying asset pool gave their issuers an informational 
advantage in evaluating them.
11 because of this 
asymmetric information, buyers did not know whether 
securities were being sold because of their low quality 
or because of the seller’s sudden need for liquidity.
12
Securitization brought new infor-
mation asymmetries to financial 
markets because the complexity 
of the   instruments and their lack of 
  transparency made it difficult for 
investors to evaluate securitized assets.
The resulting adverse selection led to market freezes, 
reflecting buyers’ belief that most securities in the 
market were of low quality. For example, during the 
crisis, the demand for asset-backed securities (AbS) 
in the United States collapsed from over US$500 bil-
lion in 2007 to US$20 billion in 2009 (Chart 1). The 
difficulty of evaluating these assets also resulted in a 
reduction in their ability to serve as collateral. Credit 
markets experienced considerable pressure: spreads 
widened significantly, and haircuts on collateral 
increased.
13 In particular, the haircut on AbS, which 
was 3 per cent to 5 per cent in August 2007, increased 
to 40 per cent to 50 per cent in August 2008 (Gorton 
and Metrick 2009). In Canada, the amount of asset-
backed commercial paper outstanding fell from about 
$120 billion to about $30 billion.
14
10 For example, 27 of the 30 tranches of asset-backed CDOs underwritten by 
  Merrill Lynch in 2007 were downgraded from a rating of AAA to “junk” (Coval, Jurek, 
and Stafford 2009).
11  This problem was particularly pronounced for junior equity tranches, which were hard 
to value, since they were usually held by the issuing bank and were traded infrequently 
(Brunnermeier 2009).
12 Drucker and Mayer (2008) find that underwriters of prime mortgage-backed securities 
appeared to exploit access to better information when trading in the secondary market. 
Elul (2009) also finds evidence of adverse selection in the prime mortgage market.
13 A haircut is the percentage by which an asset’s market value is reduced for the purpose 
of calculating the amount of overcollateralization of the repurchase agreement (Gorton 
and Metrick 2009).
14 The reduction includes a $33 billion restructuring into long-term assets by the Montreal 
Accord (Hendry, Lavoie, and Wilkins 2010).
Chart 1:  Demand for asset-backed securities
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Moreover, when financial institutions are lenders and 
borrowers (or buyers and sellers) at the same time, 
gridlock can occur if they fail to cancel out offsetting 
positions because of perceived counterparty risk 
(brunnermeier 2009).
If market participants are uncertain 
about the exposure of other participants 
to legacy assets, they disengage from 
trade, which leads to asset fire sales 
and possibly market collapse.
Flight to liquidity
The flight to liquidity that accompanies an initial eco-
nomic shock can also amplify adverse selection into a 
severe financial crisis. The concept of liquidity can be 
divided into two categories: funding liquidity, the ease 
with which investors can obtain funding, and market 
liquidity, the ease with which an asset is traded 
(brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009).
The higher preference for liquid assets during a crisis 
can be viewed as precautionary liquidity hoarding 
because of a tightening in funding liquidity. A higher 
preference for liquidity may alleviate the problem of 
adverse selection, since assets are more likely to be 
sold because the seller needs to raise liquidity rather 
than because of an asset’s low quality. nevertheless, 
a higher demand for liquid assets also implies a lower 
demand for illiquid assets. If the demand for illiquid 
assets is sufficiently low, then the asset’s price will be 
determined by the liquidity available in the market 
rather than by the expected return on the asset (Allen 
and Gale 2004). Hence, an increase in liquidity prefer-
ence can lead to fire-sale pricing and possibly to a 
market freeze.
banks were exposed to market-liquidity risk through 
the maturity mismatch of their balance sheets: they 
financed long-term asset holdings with shorter-maturity 
debt. because of the losses on their assets, some 
banks became undercapitalized; however, their 
attempts to recapitalize pushed the market price down 
further.
18 Such deleveraging can further aggravate 
adverse selection by lowering the average quality of 
18 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) explain this phenomenon, using a “loss spiral” and 
a “margin spiral.” A “loss spiral” arises when a decline in the value of the assets of a 
leveraged financial institution erodes its capital and therefore limits its ability to borrow. 
The “margin spiral” reinforces the loss spiral: the financial institution has to sell even 
more assets to reduce its leverage ratio.
on subprime mortgages are estimated to be about 
US$500 billion, but the subprime crisis triggered losses 
in the U.S. stock market that reached US$8 trillion in 
october 2008 (brunnermeier 2009).
15
In explaining the disproportionate effect of the 
subprime-mortgage crisis on the financial system, 
one can identify a number of amplification mechan-
isms that can significantly increase the initial impact 
of adverse selection: an increase in uncertainty about 
asset values, a flight to liquidity, and a misassessment 
of systemic risk.
16 Increasing uncertainty about asset 
values contributes to the decline in demand for these 
assets, while a flight to liquidity and an underestimation 
of systemic risk cause a shortage of liquid assets in 
the market.
Uncertainty about asset values
rising defaults on subprime mortgages and a lack of 
historical evidence caused an increase in market 
uncertainty about the impact of economic shocks on 
the value of financial securities. because of the com-
plexity and opaqueness of securitization, the size and 
location of expected losses were not fully known 
(Gorton 2008a). As the safest AAA subprime tranches 
experienced losses, investors started to question the 
valuation of all securitized products. This caused a 
dramatic increase in uncertainty and investor panic in 
all financial markets, not only in the subprime market 
(Caballero 2010).
Unlike an increase in risk exposure, knightian uncer-
tainty
17 may cause investors to make decisions based 
on the worst possible outcome. In this case, the beliefs 
of market participants about the extent of adverse 
selection become crucial: if they believe that there 
may be too many low-quality assets in the market, 
then trading breaks down (kirabaeva 2010).
The increase in uncertainty also made it harder to 
obtain accurate information about counterparty risk. 
As noted by Stiglitz (2008), “no bank knew what its 
own balance sheet looked like, let alone that of a bank 
to which it might lend.” If market participants are 
uncertain about the exposure of other participants to 
legacy assets, they disengage from trade, which leads 
15 According to an estimate by Bloomberg, cumulative reported losses across financial 
institutions from the second quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009 were about 
$1 trillion. These losses are expected to reach US$2.8 trillion from 2007–10.
16 Kirabaeva (2010) develops a theoretical model that illustrates how even a small amount 
of adverse selection in the asset market can lead to market freezes if it is accompanied 
by an increase in liquidity preferences, an underestimation of systemic risk, and uncer-
tainty about the asset’s value.
17  Knightian uncertainty refers to events with unknown probabilities. It is named after 
Frank Knight (1885–1972), who distinguished risk (events with objectively or subject-
ively known probabilities) and uncertainty (events where probabilities are unknown).
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Market inefficiency
Financial markets are efficient if market prices already 
reflect all known information.
21 If there are information 
imperfections, however, a market equilibrium is not 
efficient, which implies that government policy could 
improve market efficiency.
In particular, the investment allocation is not efficient 
when financial markets are subject to two frictions: 
asymmetric information about exposure to systemic 
risk, and liquidity risk because of maturity mismatch 
(kirabaeva 2010). In a market equilibrium, financial 
institutions overinvest in risky, illiquid assets (relative 
to efficient allocation), which potentially increases the 
severity of a crisis. Since asymmetric information 
reduces idiosyncratic risks, financial institutions invest 
more in risky assets. They do not take into account the 
effect of their investment choices on market liquidity, 
however, thereby creating systemic externalities. 
because of adverse selection, more assets are 
offered for sale, particularly, more low-quality assets. 
Absorbing this asset trading requires more market 
liquidity. The systemic externalities provide a rationale 
for government intervention to alleviate a crisis and 
ex-ante regulation targeted to prevent market freezes.
The systemic externalities provide a 
rationale for government intervention to 
alleviate a crisis and ex-ante regulation 
targeted to prevent market freezes.
Policy responses during a crisis
The effectiveness of policy responses during crises 
depends on the cause of the market distortions. 
kirabaeva (2010) demonstrates that if market freezes 
are caused by a shortage of liquid assets because of 
a flight to liquidity and an underestimation of systemic 
risk, then the provision of liquidity through open 
market operations can restore asset trading. However, 
if the breakdown of trade is the result of a large frac-
tion of low-quality assets in the market or uncertainty 
about it, then liquidity provision is not efficient and 
leads to further liquidity hoarding.
22 In this case, it is 
21 Bauer (2004) describes different concepts of market efficiency and its importance for 
policy-makers.
22 Bernanke (2008) notes that traditional liquidity provision was inadequate for addressing 
the strains in short-term funding markets. For example, despite massive liquidity injec-
tions by the Federal Reserve, many over-the-counter markets continued to experience 
liquidity problems.
the assets in the market. As margins and haircuts 
increase, lenders become more selective in their 
choice of collateral, which further contributes to the 
credit crunch.
19
Market beliefs about systemic risk
during the recent crisis, market participants under-
estimated systemic risk, which exacerbated the 
impact of adverse selection in financial markets. They 
underestimated the extent to which these risks were 
correlated and overestimated the benefits of diversifi-
cation. The structured securities rated AAA (even if 
correctly rated) were riskier than similarly rated stand-
alone bonds, since the correlation between these 
securities and a systemic event was much higher 
(Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 2009). overly optimistic 
ratings from credit-rating agencies further contributed 
to the underestimation of systemic risk (Gorton 2008a).
20
During the recent crisis, market 
  participants underestimated systemic 
risk, which exacerbated the impact of 
adverse selection in financial markets.
kirabaeva (2010) shows that adverse selection is likely 
to increase the severity of a crisis if systemic risk is 
underestimated. If crises are (or are believed to be) 
rare events, then financial institutions may not hold 
enough safe liquid assets to cushion the impact of a 
systemic shock when it occurs. Thus, an underestima-
tion of systemic risk contributes to liquidity shortages, 
which can cause market freezes in the same way as a 
flight to liquidity.
19 Even financial institutions that were not exposed to maturity mismatch (such as life 
insurance companies and pension funds) were affected by declining asset prices. 
For example, changes in accounting standards have led to growing use of fair value 
accounting. As a result, the decline in asset prices reduced the value of assets on 
financial institutions’ balance sheets and, hence, increased concerns about their 
capitalization and their ability to meet regulatory standards.
20 One reason that the default risks of the underlying securities were underestimated 
is that the statistical models used were based on historically low rates of mortgage 
default and delinquency. Another factor was the potential conflict of interest: invest-
ment banks (arrangers) paid the rating agencies to rate the securities that they created. 
Banks were able to choose the most favourable rating, since the rating agencies were 
consulted at the design stage about the requirements for a desired rating level.
16
AdverSe SeleCTIon And FInAnCIAl CrISeS
bAnk oF CAnAdA revIew     wInTer 2010–2011response is an ex-ante requirement for larger holdings 
of safe assets (e.g., capital requirements), which offsets 
systemic externalities and reduces the probability of 
market breakdowns during crises (Kirabaeva 2010). 
Raising the quantity and quality of the capital base, as 
well as improving balance sheet liquidity, are important 
regulatory requirements for strengthening the resiliency 
of financial institutions. The Bank of Canada also 
supports the idea of “contingent capital,”
27 which can 




more effective to purchase legacy assets. Removing 
such assets from the market reduces adverse selection 
and uncertainty.
Troubled assets can also be removed by the direct 
injection of liquidity into financial institutions
23 and the 
creation of a “bad bank” (a closed-end fund to hold 
the toxic assets).
24 Governments can also introduce 
loan guarantees that reduce counterparty risks.
25 
Even a government announcement about intended 
asset purchases at a later date can cause markets to 
function again (Chiu and Koeppl 2010).
During the recent crisis, central banks in advanced 
economies intervened on an unprecedented scale. 
Central banks typically provide liquidity in times of 
crisis through open market operations. As interest 
rates started to approach the zero bound, however, 
some central banks used unconventional measures, 
such as providing banks with liquidity on extraordinary 
terms and at longer maturities and intervening in 
selected credit markets to support liquidity in sec-
ondary markets (Hannoun 2010). Chart 2 illustrates 
the total liquidity extended in advanced economies 
relative to GDP. As a result, central banks’ balance 
sheets expanded significantly (Chart 3). For example, 
the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet exceeded 15 per 
cent of GDP in 2009, compared with 6 per cent of 
GDP in 2007 and 2008 (IMF International Financial 
Statistics). The Bank of Canada intervened to provide 
liquidity to financial institutions. It used traditional 
liquidity tools, such as the overnight rate, and 
developed new liquidity tools that included term 
  purchase and resale agreements and a term loan 
facility (Zorn, Wilkins, and Engert 2009).
Government intervention during crises may create a 
moral hazard problem: if market participants antici-
pate such interventions, then their optimal holdings of 
risky assets are larger. Government bailouts (debt 
guarantees) can be inevitable during crises, and as a 
result, they lead to the inefficient allocation of capital 
towards risky investments.
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